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f that infants look like). It is our antecedent predisposition to attend to and care for infants that rubs off on anything that looks like them. This conflicts with Morreall's view in which infants acquired a certain look because of its independent ability to attract and please adults of the species.
While it is no doubt true that cuteness in humans may now be identified with some such set as the one mentioned in (I), there is nothing essential about the link between any particular set of features and 'cuteness'; no set of features is intrinsically 'cute'. Rather, cuteness is just any set of features that is typical of babies? If human babies all (or usually) had six ears, four of which dropped off by the age of seven, we would probably find that cute. Thus, while it is inevitable that somewhere among our evolutionary ancestors the particular features now deemed cute were not common among the infants of the species (some of our ancestors were one-celled, after all), this does not mean that they were not cute (nor, on the other hand, does it mean that our one-celled ancestors were cute when newly divided). Ifthey required extensive care from their parents, then it seems pretty much guaranteed that, as a rule, the adults of the species were every bit as much attracted to the infants as is the case for us, their descendants.
Thus, while it may be that the set of particular features deemed cute in modern human infants was not possessed by the infants of many (most, as it happens) of our ancestor species, this does not mean that those ancestral infants lacked some crucial means of attracting the attention of their parents. Where such attention was vital for the raising of children, it is impossible that our ancestors lacked 'cuteness'. They had different features (they lacked the ones alluded to in (I) ), but they were 'cute': they pleased and attracted their parents. So the idea that cuteness may be described as in ( 2 ) covers an ambiguity: those mammalian ancestors may have lacked the particular features that make Dylan and Jordan and Betty Lou and Kate cute among modem humans, but they certainly had to have already had a set of features that encouraged and supported nurture from parents5 That is, they must have been cute (as a rule) from the perspective of those parents.
The upshot of this is that characterizing cuteness as in (3) is not at all plausible. Parents don't us a rule care for children because they are attractive on some independent standard; instead, their standard of attractiveness in children is in large part based upon how kids happen to look, as a rule. But if this is correct, then talking about cuteness as in (4) offers a very implausible account of how it is that modem babies come to look the way they do. Indeed, I suspect that if the features of modem human infants were to be introducedwhether gradually or abruptly -into the infant population of the ancestral mammals (or whatever) that we've been envisioning, the greatest likelihood is that the infants who bore those features would have been deemed unattractive, and would have suffered the fate of modem kids who are thought not to be cute.6 Furthermore, the real reason for the fact that contemporary babies typically have the features usually associated with cuteness is most profitably sought elsewhere. For example: large head size in comparison to body size is best related to facts about optimal biological strategies of physical develop ment in creatures that rely upon large, complicated brains at early stages of growth. This is not, I think, an unimportant quibble. Searching for a quality called 'cuteness' that somehow intervenes between babies and adults, fortuitously helping the latter feel kindly towards the former, commits a common sort of mistake. It is not my purpose to call into question the notion that adults are disposed to find babies attractive or cute. They may even be 'hard-wired' in this way to a considerable extent. But this is just a way of saying that adults are positively disposed towards babies (although it makes special reference, to be sure, to certain notable characteristics of babies). Cuteness has no more ontic status than do the warm cockles on the hearts of people who are in the presence of cute infants.
What is the upshot of this? Morreall talks about cuteness as if it were some property that human infants might not have had-sort of like the opposable thumb. Without the latter, some would claim, we never would have become the splendid creatures that we are. We would have become something else, I suppose. But without cuteness, what? Is there an alternative? If any ancestor of ours, in any possible line of evolution, had not had cuteness (i.e., a set of features that encouraged and supported parental dispositions to take care of the infant), it seems unlikely that he or she would have lived long enough to be an ancestor of ours. If cuteness is to be a characteristic that plays the role that Morreall thinks it plays, then its absence will be tolerable only in relatively late, relatively civilized stages of the evolution of the species, in which (at least sometimes) non-cute infants are cared for in spite of their lesser attractiveness.
Isn't it most likely that humans and apes, being the kinds of creatures that they are (needing the kind of care in infancy that they need) must always be disposed favourably to babyish looking creatures (that is, creatures that look like infants of the parents' own species), whatever the typical appearance of a baby might be? What if they hadn't been so disposed? H o w could the raising of such infants ever have got going?
In the end, it cannot be that cuteness, in itself, has evolutionary value. This is because ancestors of ours could not, in any interesting sense, have been uncute. It is not that species that lacked cuteness among their young would have died off, it is that anything that is typical of infants, within any species that requires extensive nurture of parents for young, is definitive of cuteness for that species. As Morrcall observes, it is not necessary to imagine that the infants of every species appear 'cute' to their parents. Where no care is needed-where inhnts hit the ground running, as it were-it is perfectly reasonable to imagine that parents might not care at all about their infants. Thus it is perfectly possible that sufficiently distant ancestors of ours did not find their infant children 'cute' in any sense. This has nothing to do, though, with whether these infants had these or those particular physical features. It is strictly a function of whether the infants needed care, whether they were 'helplas', etc.
' My text here, I guess, is Hans Christian Andersen's 'The Ugly Duckling'.
